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The EU’s Competence to Conclude Trade
Agreements
The EU–Singapore Opinion
panos koutrakos
I External Competence at Times of Public Disquiet
It was observed some time ago that ‘[a]nything to do with the European
Communities is complex, and this is particularly so for the law governing
their external relations’.1 The principles governing competence and
exclusivity are among the most complex in European Union (EU) exter-
nal relations law, and neither the considerable case law of the European
Court of Justice (‘the Court’), nor the efforts of the Lisbon Treaty to
codify and clarify them havemade them amodel of clarity. These, and the
ensuing issues about mixed agreements, used to attract the interest only
of European Union (EU) external relations scholars and legal advisers,
that is a rather small body of specialists.
And yet, the competence of the EU to negotiate trade agreements on its
own or along with the Member States has attracted wider attention
recently. This is partly because of the decentralised nature of mixed
agreements: the latter are concluded by the Council and, typically, all
Member States which ratify such agreements in accordance with their
constitutional arrangements. This process may not be smooth, as it
involves national and regional assemblies. This point was illustrated
starkly in the case of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) that the EU negotiated with Canada:2 its signing
and provisional application was nearly derailed by the Walloon
Parliament in October 2016, and was by no means a foregone conclusion
1 A. Aust,Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press 2000), 55.
2 See Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) [2017] OJ
L11/23.
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in Germany3 and Austria either. The fate of the Association Agreement
that the EU negotiated with Ukraine was similarly instructive: the
Netherlands ratiﬁed it in May 2017 only after a drawn-out process follow-
ing its rejection in a non-binding referendum and certain clariﬁcations
that the European Council was forced to make.4
The above episodes convey a growing sense of public disquiet about
the treaty-making activities of the EU. This expresses a range of concerns.
Some are policy related: in the case of CETA, for instance, concerns were
raised about the impact on environmental and labour standards, and of
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms on regulatory
autonomy; in the case of the EU–Ukraine Agreement, issues were raised
about the movement of persons and ﬁnancial support to Ukraine.
The fate of international agreements negotiated by the EU is also affected
by issues that are extraneous to the agreements themselves, such as
domestic politics, concerns about immigration, wider concerns about
the direction of the EU, and an increasingly vocal anti-globalisation
rhetoric.
In the light of this politically charged environment, Opinion 2/15 of
the Court of Justice on the signing and conclusion of the Free Trade
Agreement between the European Union and Singapore5 was anticipated
eagerly. Finalised after 4.5 years of negotiations, the Agreement is a deep
and comprehensive free trade agreement: its content goes beyond the
traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services,
and covers areas such as intellectual property rights, public procurement,
competition, sustainable development and investment.6
Given the wide scope of the Agreement, the question that the Court
was asked to address about the nature of the competence of the EU and
theMember States is topical. First, it pertained to issues that are central to
the conduct of the Union’s external trade policy. Second, the Opinion
was expected to shed light on the reforms that the Lisbon Treaty intro-
duced regarding external relations in general and, in particular, trade
policy. Third, the Opinion has implications for the form of trade
3 BVerfGE 143, 65, 2 BvR 1368/16 (13 October 2016).
4 European Council, Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 28Member States
of the European Union, meeting within the European Council, on the EU–Ukraine
Association Agreement, annexed to European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, Press
Release 785/16 (15 December 2016).
5 Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992.
6 The negotiation of such agreements has become a priority for the EU’s trade policy, see
European Commission, ‘Global Europe –Competing in theWorld –AContribution to the
EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy’ COM(2006) 567 ﬁnal.
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agreements negotiated by the EU, given the emergence of domestic
parliaments as powerful players in the process of the ratiﬁcation of
mixed agreements. The signiﬁcance of these issues is illustrated by the
fact that the Opinion was rendered by the Full Court, which is
a composition that is rarely convened and only for the most important
matters. It is also noteworthy that the governments of twenty-ﬁve
Member States made submissions.
II A Richer Conception of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy
The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is the oldest external policy
of the EU. It was introduced in the original Treaty of Rome and
then gradually expanded, ﬁrst at Amsterdam, then at Nice and
ﬁnally at Lisbon in Article 207 TFEU. The CCP has been described
as ‘represent[ing] the [European Community, as it then was] at the
height of its legal powers, control, and supremacy over the member
states’.7 This was due to two main factors: the EU’s competence is
exclusive8 and is exercised, mainly, by qualiﬁed majority voting in
the Council.9
In the light of the above characteristics, the deﬁnition of the scope of
CCP has considerable legal and policy implications. After all, the long
history of legal basis disputes in the area10 illustrates the eagerness of the
European Commission for the scope of the policy to be construed widely,
and the concern of the Member States that their continuing role on the
international trade arena should not be eroded.
In Opinion 2/15, the Court of Justice clariﬁes the scope of CCP in two
ways. In terms of its overall approach, it conﬁrms previous case law that
an international agreement is covered by Article 207 TFEU if it is about
trade with third states in a speciﬁc manner, that is if ‘it is essentially
intended to promote, facilitate or govern such trade and has direct and
7 D. McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Longman 1997), 70.
8 Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU. This provision, introduced at Lisbon, formalised earlier case law: see
Opinion 1/75, EU:C:1975:145 and 41/76 Donckerwolcke, EU:C:1976:182.
9 Arts. 207(2) and (4) TFEU.
10 See, for instance, on the delineation of CCP from environmental policy, Opinion 2/00,
EU:C:2001:664; C-281/01 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2002:761; C-94/03 Commission
v. Council, EU:C:2006:2; C-178/03 Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:4.
On the various strands of CCP-related legal basis disputes, see P. Koutrakos, EU
International Relations Law, 2nd edn (Hart 2015), 52.
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immediate effects on it’.11 As for the speciﬁc components of the
EU–Singapore Agreement, the following were deemed to be covered by
Article 207 TFEU:
– all commitments on market access for goods (including remedies,
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, cus-
toms and trade facilitation);
– most commitments on market access for services (including all four
modes of supply corresponding to the WTO classiﬁcation,12 ﬁnancial
services and mutual qualiﬁcations, and transport services not inher-
ently linked to the physical act of moving goods or persons from one
place to another by means of transport);13
– provisions on non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in renewable
energy generation, and government procurement in goods and ser-
vices that fall within the scope of CCP;
– commitments on direct investment, that is investment enabling the
person providing the capital to participate effectively in the manage-
ment or control of the company to which the capital is made available;
– commitments on intellectual property protection (covering copyright
and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, designs,
patents, pharmaceutical products and plant varieties);
– commitments on competition;
– commitments on sustainable development.
The Opinion brings clarity in a policy ﬁeld that, while rationalised at
Lisbon, was still surrounded by uncertainty regarding its scope. A case in
point is foreign direct investment. The Court deﬁnes the term broadly by
rejecting the distinction between the admission of foreign investment
covering capital movements and the establishment of foreign investors
(which were clearly covered by Article 207 TFEU) and the post-
admission protection of investments (which the Council and certain
Member States had argued fell beyond the scope of CCP).14 This
11 Opinion 2/15, paras. 35–6, with references, among others, to C-414/11 Sankyo, EU:
C:2013:520 paras. 50–1; C-137/12 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2013:675, paras. 56–7;
and Opinion 3/15, EU:C:2017:114, para. 61.
12 With reference to Opinion 1/08, EU:C:2009:739, paras. 4, 118–89.
13 These consist of aircraft report and maintenance services during which the aircraft is
withdrawn from service, as well as selling and marketing of air transport services.
14 See A. Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2011), 49–61.
For the argument about a narrow construction of FDI under Art. 207 TFEU, see
M. Krajewski, ‘The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy’, in A. Biondi and
P. Eeckhout (eds.), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012), 292, 303–4.
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broad interpretation of foreign direct investment is consistent with the
wording of Article 207 TFEU, which makes no reference to such distinc-
tion and provides no indication that it should be conﬁned to the admis-
sion of foreign direct investment. It is also consistent with the objective of
the relevant provisions of the Agreement: as they aim to contribute to the
legal certainty of investors, they meet the general test set out by the Court
at the outset, namely to promote, facilitate and govern, and to have
a direct and immediate impact on trade between the EU and Singapore.
Another feature of the Opinion is the anchoring of CCP in the broader
set of the Union’s external action. This becomes apparent in relation to
the provisions of the Agreement about sustainable development the
objective of which is deemed to form ‘an integral part’ of the conduct of
CCP.15 In order to appreciate the implications of this development, we
need to step back and consider the position of CCP within the broader
framework of EU external relations.
It is recalled that one of the main innovations of the Lisbon Treaty in
external relations was the articulation of a set of principles and objectives
in Article 21 TEU which would apply to all strands of the Union’s
external action (CCP, development cooperation, economic, ﬁnancial
and technical cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid,
restrictive measures, international agreements, the Union’s relations
with international organisations and third countries and Union
delegations).16 These objectives are broad in their scope and include,
among others, sustainable development through measures designed to
preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable
management of global natural resources (Article 21(2)(d) TEU).
The introduction of a set of common principles and objectives aimed
to improve the coherence of the EU’s external policies. In doing so, it was
about a problem that has been captured vividly as follows: ‘Europe has
a hundred left hands and none of them knows what the right hand is
doing. Trade, development, aid, immigration policy, education, cultural
exchange, classic diplomacy, organised crime: each European policy has
an impact, but the effects are fragmented and often self-contradictory.’17
In this vein, the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the ﬁrst time the term
‘external action’ to describe all aspects of the EU’s external policies,
including the CCP. Semantics matter, and the singular term chosen by
15 Opinion 2/15, para. 147.
16 See J. Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (Oxford University
Press 2016).
17 T. Garton-Ash, Free World (Penguin 2005), 218.
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the drafters of the Treaties conveys an understanding of the different
strands of the Union’s external policies (trade, economic, development,
social, political, security) as an integrated whole. This is translated in the
requirement that whatever the EU does in the world should respect the
common principles and pursue the common objectives set out in Article
21 TFEU. This point is brought home in different contexts in primary
law, both in relation to external action in general (Articles 21(3) TEU and
205 TFEU), and in relation to the CCP in particular (Article 207(1)
TFEU).
It was in the light of the above context that the Court brought the
provisions of the EU–Singapore Agreement on sustainable development
within the scope of CCP and, therefore, the EU’s exclusive competence.
In particular, it concluded that there is an ‘obligation on the European
Union to integrate those objectives and principles [set out in Article 21
TEU] into the conduct of its common commercial policy’, of which ‘the
objective of sustainable development henceforth forms an integral part’.18
The implications of the above approach to the scope of CCP are
twofold. On the one hand, Opinion 2/15 gives speciﬁc meaning to the
reorganisation of the primary rules on external action introduced at
Lisbon. Neither the provision of common principles and objectives in
Article 21 TEU, nor the cross-references to them in other parts of the
Treaties19 are merely rhetoric. They have legal implications which the
Court is prepared to monitor. On the other hand, a richer and more
dynamic conception of CCP emerges, the trade aspects of which are
understood within the context of a multidimensional and evolving inter-
national economic policy. The wording in Opinion 2/15 is noteworthy:
rather than merely acknowledging the implications of trade policy for
sustainable development, the Court construes the latter as ‘an integral
part’ of the conduct of the former. This, in itself, is not novel in the
history of EU external relations. After all, in its early case law on CCP in
the 1970s, the Court had construed the scope of CCP sufﬁciently broadly
to enable it to adjust to the developing patterns of international trade.20
Opinion 2/15, however, goes farther, as its interpretation is embedded in,
and gives teeth to, the revamped legal landscape set out in the Lisbon
Treaty.
18 Opinion 2/15, paras. 143, 147.
19 Art. 205 TFEU in relation to external action in general, and Art. 207(1) TFEU in relation
to CCP. See also Art. 23(1) TEU in relation to CFSP.
20 See, for instance, the approach to commodity agreements in Opinion 1/78, EU:
C:1979:224.
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The above broad interpretation of the scope of CCP in the light of
Article 21 TEU and Articles 205 and 207(1) TFEU raises two questions
about the overall reach of the policy. The ﬁrst is about competence: may
the richer and more diverse content of CCP erode, for instance, the
development cooperation policy of the EU (Article 208 TFEU)? Given
the Union’s exclusive competence over the former and its shared com-
petence over the latter,21 such an outcome would have serious repercus-
sions for the powers of the Member States. Opinion 2/15, however,
suggests that there is a substantive limit to the reach of CCP. This is
based on the speciﬁc provisions of the Agreement on sustainable devel-
opment. As the Court pointed out, the latter do not entail harmonisation
of social and environmental protection in the contracting parties.
Instead, they are about rendering trade between the EU and Singapore
subject to compliance with the international obligations that both parties
have assumed concerning social protection of workers and environmen-
tal protection. Put differently, had the relevant provisions introduced
harmonisation in the EU, they would have fallen beyond the scope of
CCP. This is because competence in social policy and environmental
protection is shared, and Article 207(6) TFEU prevents the conduct of
the CCP from affecting the delimitation of competences between the EU
and its Member States. There is also another aspect of the Agreement’s
provisions on sustainable development that is noteworthy: their wording
was carefully couched in such terms as to underline their links with the
conduct of trade. These provisions read as if their drafters had an eye on
protecting them from scrutiny that might question their trade-related
credentials. All in all, there appears to be a substantive limitation on how
far the Union’s exclusive competence in CCP could take us where the
exercise of other competences is at stake.22
The second question about the reach of CCP is policy related: does the
duty of the EU to integrate all the objectives set out in Article 21 TEU in
its CCP enable the Court to exercise judicial review of the substantive
policy underpinning a given agreement? In other words, would it be
possible for the Court to annul the conclusion of an international agree-
ment concluded under Article 207 TFEU because its provisions do not
give sufﬁcient weight to the objective of sustainable development?
The answer to this question must be negative. Primary law itself is
21 Art. 4(2)(b) and (e) TFEU.
22 In the words of Opinion 2/15, para. 164: ‘Article 3(1)(e) TFEU does not prevail over these
other provisions of the FEU Treaty [namely Art. 3(1)(d) and (2) and Article 4(2)(b) and
(e) TFEU on the nature of the EU’s competence]’.
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couched in terms that grant the Union’s institutions policy leeway. For
instance, no absolute obligation of result is imposed in this area: the EU is
to ‘foster’ the sustainable social development of developing countries,
and to ‘help’ develop measures about the sustainable management of
global natural resources.23 The other objectives of external action are
couched in similarly broad terms (for instance, the EU is to ‘encourage’
the integration of third countries into the world economy).24
Aside from the wording of Article 21 TEU, the Court has traditionally
acknowledged the discretion that the EU institutions enjoy in policymaking
on the international scene. The best-known example is the refusal to exercise
direct judicial review of EU law in the light ofWTO rules.25 In the context of
CCP in particular, the Court has declined to read into the objective of ‘the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade’ laid down in
Article 206 TFEU a general obligation on the EU institutions to liberalise
trade with third countries ‘where to do so would be contrary to the interests
of the Community’.26 It is the Union’s interest that determines the speciﬁc
substantive choices that EU makes on the international scene. As the deter-
mination of the Union’s interest is a matter for the EU’s decision-making
institutions, the latter enjoy discretion that is inherent in the conduct of
CCP.27 Viewed from this angle, and in addition to the substantive limit set
out above, there is, therefore, a policy-related limit on the broad interpreta-
tion of CCP and its anchoring in the common set of objectives that govern
all strands of the EU’s external action.
III A Broad Understanding of Implied Competence
The Union’s exclusive competence to conclude international agreements
is not conﬁned to cases where it is expressly set out in primary or
23 Art. 23(2)(d) and (f) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ
C202/13.
24 Art. 23(2)(e) TEU.
25 See C-249/96 Portugal v. Council, EU:C:1999:574; C-377/02 Van Parys, EU:C:2005:121;
C-120/06P; C-121/06P FIAMM, EU:C:2008:476.
26 C-150/94 UK v. Council, EU:C:1998:547, para. 67.
27 To that effect, see M. Cremona, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The Common Commercial Policy
Six Years after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2017) Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
2017: 2, 31–2. At 39, Cremona observes the emergence of a procedural obligation based
on T-512/12 Front Polisario, EU:T:2015:953; and the Opinion of AG Wathelet in C-104/
16P Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:677, even though this issue was not addressed by the ECJ
in its judgment on appeal that dismissed the action as inadmissible (C-104/16P Front
Polisario, EU:C:2016:973).
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secondary law (as is the case regarding the CCP). According to Article
3(2) TFEU, such competence may also arise ‘in so far as its conclusion
may affect common rules or alter their scope’. This formulation seeks to
convey the principle ﬁrst introduced in theAETR judgment28 in the early
1970s which has developed over the years in a long and at times complex
line of cases.
In Opinion 2/15, the Court held that the Union’s implied competence
was exclusive in relation to commitments on transport services and
public procurement on such services. This was because the Agreement
established a set of rules which either differed from these set out in
internal common rules29 or overlapped to a large extent with such
rules.30 This approach is not novel: in earlier case law, the Court had
already held that the provisions of an agreement need not coincide fully
with internal common rules in order to risk affecting the latter or altering
their scope;31 it had also held that a contradiction between the agreement
and internal common rules is not necessary for exclusivity to be trig-
gered, as long as the meaning, scope and effectiveness of the latter might
be affected.32
A broad approach, therefore, to implied exclusive competence had
already emerged in the Court’s case law. What Opinion 2/15 does is to
illustrate it with considerable force. For instance, the references to the
28 22/70 Commission v. Council, EU:C:1971:32.
29 This was the case in maritime transport and the impact of the Agreement on Council
Regulation (EEC) 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to
maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third
countries [1986] OJ L378/1.
30 This was the case in rail transport (covered by Directive 2012/34/EU establishing a single
European railway area [2012] OJ L343/32); road transport (covered by Regulation (EC)
1071/2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to
pursue the occupation of road transport operator [2009] OJ L300/51; Regulation (EC)
1072/2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market [2009]
OJ L300/72; Regulation (EC) 1073/2009 on common rules for access to the international
market for coach and bus services [2009] OJ L300/88); and public procurement in
transport services (covered by Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement [2014] OJ
L94/65. As for internal waterways transport, the commitments introduced by the
Agreement were held to be of such narrow scope as to be irrelevant for the assessment
of the overall competence of the Union in the area of transport.
31 See Opinion 1/03, EU:C:2006:81, para. 126; C-114/12 Commission v. Council, EU:
C:2014:2151, paras. 69–70; Opinion 1/13, EU:C:2014:2303, paras. 72–3; Opinion 3/15,
paras. 106–7.
32 See Opinion 1/03, paras. 143, 151–3; Opinion 1/13, paras. 84–90; C-66/13Green Network,
EU:C:2014:2399, paras. 48–9 and, even earlier, Opinion 2/91, EU:C:1993:106, paras. 25–6;
C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, EU:C:2002:625, para. 82.
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speciﬁc provisions of the Agreement and those of the internal secondary
legislation are lacking in detail. This is noteworthy, given that, in Opinion
1/03, the Court had held that the assessment of the Union’s implied
external competence to conclude an agreement ought to rely upon
a ‘comprehensive and detailed analysis’ of both its provisions and the
internal common rules in the area.33 Such analysis is not present in
Opinion 2/15. While the Court takes the Chapters of the Agreement
with Singapore in turn and examines them against EU secondary legisla-
tion, it examines them in only broad terms. This analytical sparseness is
also reﬂected by the streamlined form of Opinion 2/15.34 All in all, it
becomes clear that the threshold to meet the AETR test and its codiﬁca-
tion in Article 3(2) TFEU is by no means high.
There are two areas which are deemed in Opinion 2/15 to fall beyond
the EU’s exclusive competence. The ﬁrst is about indirect foreign invest-
ment (such as portfolio investment, which involves the movement of
capital for personal gain without any intention to inﬂuence the manage-
ment and control of the undertaking where the investment is made): the
Agreement with Singapore could not affect Article 63 TFEU (on free
movement of capital) in the meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU, because the
latter applied to secondary legislation, rather than primary law.
The second area where the EU shared competence with the Member
States was about the establishment of an ISDS mechanism: the right of
investors to bring an action against either party before an arbitral tribunal
would deprive national courts of their jurisdiction, an outcome which
would require the Member States’ consent.
Opinion 2/15 makes two important constitutional points in relation to
implied competence. The ﬁrst is about the construction of exclusivity
under Article 3(2) TFEU. In its approach to the competence on indirect
foreign investment, the Court conﬁrms that that provision is to be
interpreted in the light of the previous case law on implied competence.
This is an important point as the broad wording of Article 3(2) TFEU had
failed to capture the subtleties of the AETR principle and its development
over the years.35 Viewed beyond its context, Article 3(2) TFEU could be
33 Opinion 1/03, para. 133.
34 The Opinion is much shorter than the detailed and in-depth analysis provided in Opinion
of AG Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992.
35 As Dashwood puts it: ‘Article 3(2) TFEU is an object lesson in the unwisdom of seeking to
enshrine in a Treaty provision subtle concepts that have been developed, and are still
developing, in the case law’ ( A. Dashwood, ‘Mixity in the Era of the Treaty of Lisbon’, in
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interpreted so widely as to impinge on the principle of conferral (Article
5(1) TEU). Such an interpretation is rightly rejected in Opinion 2/15.
The second constitutional point is about the existence of implied
competence. Once it has ruled out exclusivity for foreign indirect invest-
ment, the Court does not stop there. Instead, it goes on to examine the
existence of the EU’s competence under Article 216(1) TFEU. It is
recalled that the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the ﬁrst time in primary
law the distinction between the existence of the Union’s competence to
conclude international agreements (Article 216(1) TFEU) and the exclu-
sive competence to do so (Article 3(2) TFEU). Having held that the latter
was inapplicable, the Court focused on the former: the conclusion of
international agreements is ‘necessary in order to achieve, within the
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the
Treaties’ (Article 216(1) TFEU), the latter being free movement of capital
(Article 63 TFEU); freemovement of capital relates to the internal market
(Article 4(2)(a) TFEU) over which the EU had shared competence
(Article 4(1) TFEU); the EU, therefore, also has shared competence to
conclude an agreement on capital movements. This line of reasoning is
clear and takes seriously both the new provision of Article 216 TFEU and
the distinction between the existence and nature of implied external
competence.36
While, however, it seeks to clarify the primary rules on the constitu-
tional characteristics of implied external competence, Opinion 2/15
appears to obscure the constitutional implications of shared competence.
Having held that the provisions of the Agreement on most transport
services and ISDS fell within shared competence, the Court
concludes that the relevant Chapters ‘cannot be approved by the
European Union alone’.37 This formulation (repeated three times in the
Opinion) appeared to suggest that the existence of shared competence in
these areas would necessarily give rise to mixity. No argument was
provided to that effect. Such a conclusion would have been problematic
in so far as Opinion 2/15 did not describe the national competence
related to the jurisdiction of national courts on investors’ claims against
C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member
States in the World (Hart 2010), 362).
36 While far from clear in earlier case law, this distinction becamemore prominent later, see
Opinion 1/03.
37 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, para. 244 (regarding transport services) and
para. 304 (regarding ISDS). The same point was made in relation to the provisions on
transparency, in so far as they related to indirect foreign investment (para. 282).
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either party as exclusive. After all, such jurisdiction would ﬂow directly
from the conclusion of the EU–Singapore Agreement, which would,
therefore, become ‘an integral part’ of the EU legal order and binding
on Member States under Article 216(2) TFEU). Neither was the compe-
tence of Member States on indirect foreign investment described in the
Opinion as exclusive.
What would the alternative view be? As there is no power reserved for
the Member States, there is nothing to prevent the EU from concluding
on its own an agreement covering an area of shared competence, pro-
vided that the Council has adopted a decision to that effect in accordance
with the treaty-making procedures laid down in Article 218 TFEU. Put
differently, while the Agreement with Singapore could be adopted as
a mixed agreement, there was no legal requirement to that effect, the
issue being ultimately for the Council to decide.38 The type of mixity
pertaining to the Agreement is, therefore, optional, in contrast to the
obligatory mixity which would arise in cases of agreements covering
areas reserved exclusively for the Member States.39 In other words,
there is a policy choice for the exercise of the Union’s shared competence,
and it is for the Council to make it.40
In a subsequent judgment, the Court made it clear that Opinion 2/15
should not be read as ruling out facultative mixity. In Case C-600/14
Germany v. Council, the Grand Chamber held that the reference in
Opinion 2/15 to joint participation should be understood in the speciﬁc
factual and legal context of the case.41 This clariﬁcation is welcome. After
all, to ignore the above function of mixity would not necessarily follow
38 EU–Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement [2016] OJ L71/3 was concluded by
the EU alone for reasons of political expediency, even though it included areas not
covered by the EU’s exclusive competence (hence the qualiﬁcations in Recital 5 Council
Decision 2016/342 on the EU–Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement [2016]
OJ L71/1).
39 Allan Rosas has described it as ‘facultative mixity’ ( A. Rosas, ‘The European Union and
Mixed Agreements’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The General Law of EC
External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2000), 205–6).
40 See Opinion of AGWahl in Opinion 3/15, EU:C:2016:657, paras. 119–22 where he argues
that ‘[t]he choice between a mixed agreement or an EU-only agreement, when the subject
matter of the agreement falls within an area of shared competence (or of parallel
competence), is generally a matter for the discretion of the EU legislature’ (para. 119).
See also Opinion of AG Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, paras. 73ff.
41 EU:C:2017:935, para. 67 (‘in making that ﬁnding, the Court did no more than acknowl-
edge the fact that, as stated by the Council in the course of the proceedings relating to that
Opinion, there was no possibility of the required majority being obtained within the
Council for the Union to be able to exercise alone the external competence that it shares
with the Member States in this area’).
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from the very primary provisions on the basis of which the Court
substantiated the Union’s shared competence, namely Article 216
TFEU (on international agreements) and Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(1)
TFEU (on the internal market competence). If it were not for the
clariﬁcation in Case C-600/14 Germany v. Council, a conceptual incon-
sistency could also have arisen: if taken literally, a narrow approach to
mixity would have sat uncomfortably with the broad approach to exclu-
sivity that the Court had endorsed. Introducing further constitutional
mystery almost ﬁve decades after the introduction of the AETR principle,
and given its development in case law and codiﬁcation in primary law at
Lisbon, would have been disconcerting.
IV The Implications of Opinion 2/15
As the Court sanctioned the participation of the Member States in the
conclusion of the EU–Singapore Agreement, Opinion 2/15 may appear
to suggest a victory for them. Appearances, however, are deceptive.
The arguments of all the intervening Member States about a narrower
reading of exclusivity were largely rejected, and the Court went farther
than Advocate General Sharpston who, in her Opinion, had suggested
a narrower approach to exclusivity.42 Overall, the exclusive competence
of the Union in international trade has been bolstered.
In substantive terms, the Opinion did not address the issue of the
compatibility of the ISDS mechanism with EU law, in general, and the
principle of autonomy, in particular. As this was not part of the
Commission’s request, the Opinion was conﬁned to ascertaining the
nature of the Union’s competence.43 At the time of writing, these ques-
tions are examined by the Court of Justice in the request for an Opinion
that Belgium has made under Article 218(11) TFEU on the ISDS system
laid down in CETA.44
At policy level, the broad approach to CCP and excusive implied
competence in Opinion 2/15 makes it easier for the EU to negotiate
and conclude trade agreements. It also raises two policy questions for
the EU institutions to address. The ﬁrst is narrow and is about the role of
investment protection in trade agreements. The removal of the invest-
ment chapter and the ISDS mechanism from a trade agreement would
42 Opinion 2/15.
43 Opinion 2/15, para. 30.
44 Opinion 1/17 (pending).
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render the latter wholly within the Union’s exclusive competence, hence
dispensing with the uncertainty and delays associated with the ratiﬁca-
tion process of mixed agreements in domestic legal orders. In fact, this is
what the Commission proposed, namely splitting the Agreement with
Canada into two separate agreements, a free trade (concluded by the EU
alone) and an investment protection one (by the EU and the Member
States). 45
The second policy question is broader and is related to the political
costs that would ensue if the EU institutions adjusted the content of trade
agreements in order to avoid mixity. Would such a policy choice be
construed as an effort to remove treaty-making at EU level from national
accountability mechanisms? Might this not fuel the public disquiet that
was outlined in the introduction of this chapter?
Whether the public disquiet about the EU’s trade deals could be sated
by legal ingenuity depends, among others, on the extent to which it would
be instrumentalised by domestic politics or populist rhetoric. National
concerns, nonetheless, raise fundamental questions about the joint par-
ticipation of the Union and the Member States and the extent to which
the latter may participate in what the former does in the world. These
questions require that decision-makers in the Union and the Member
States reﬂect on the political, practical and legal implications.46 To that
effect, a number of factors are worth considering. In terms of trade
politics, the Union’s appetite for negotiating bilateral agreements has
not diminished. For instance, at the time of writing, an ambitious
Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan has been ﬁnalised, and
there is conﬁdence about the progress of negotiations with Mercosur
and Mexico. In substantive policy terms, the EU has been active in
reaching political compromises that would address public concerns and
would also pave the way to the smooth application of trade agreements.
On the one hand, clariﬁcations and assurances are given internally, for
instance in relation to the Agreement with Ukraine.47 On the other hand,
on the international scene, the EU has become an advocate of reform of
45 COM(2018) 194–7 ﬁnal.
46 Two groups of academics have intervened, expressing differing views on the intensity and
scope of national participation in theUnion’s international treaty-making: for amore rigorous
and direct involvement of national authorities, see I. Dreyer, ‘“Namur Declaration” Calls for
More National Involvement in EU Trade Deals’, Borderlex (5 December 2016); for a more
streamlined EU approach, see ‘For Strong and Democratically Legitimized EU International
Agreements’, Trading Together (25 January 2017).
47 Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council,
annexed to the European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 15 December 2016.
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the existing ISDS system and the introduction of a multilateral invest-
ment court.48
In addition to the climate of public disquiet that has dominated EU
politics recently, Opinion 2/15 was rendered at a time of uncertainty
marked by Brexit. The Opinion was eagerly anticipated in the United
Kingdom, as its conclusions were considered relevant to the agreement
that would govern the post-Brexit relations between the EU and the UK.
The negotiation of such agreement is bound to be complex, and, there-
fore, it is in the UK’s interest to reduce the number of legal obstacles that
may derail this process. Viewed from this angle, a UK–EU-only agree-
ment, that is without the participation of the Member States, is the most
attractive formula for the British negotiators: there would be fewer
constituencies to satisfy, the unpredictable role of national parliaments
and regional assemblies would be avoided, and the whole process would
take less time to complete. It is ironic that the UK should seek such
a solution, as the British government has been one of the staunchest
supporters of the continuing role of Member States in international trade
negotiations. In fact, it made submissions to that effect in Opinion 2/15.
It is, therefore, the rejection of most of its arguments that might make it
easier for it to negotiate its post-Brexit relationship with the EU.
It by no means follows, of course, that the content of a UK–EU
agreement would mirror the EU–Singapore Agreement. After all, while
comprehensive, the latter may not provide a model for the former, given
the unique circumstances in which the post-Brexit UK–EU arrangement
would be negotiated. Furthermore, the broader the scope and the deeper
the content of a UK–EU Agreement, the more complex its conclusion. If,
for instance, such an agreement were an association agreement, its con-
clusion would require unanimity in the Council in accordance with
Article 218(8) paragraph 2 TFEU. The UK government has suggested
that this type of agreement would be of no interest, and that it would
negotiate, instead, for a ‘big, very ambitious free trade agreement’.49
While the shape of the post-Brexit arrangement is unclear, ruling out
48 See European Commission, ‘Commission Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and
beyond – the Path for Reform – Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from
Current ad hoc Arbitration towards an Investment Court’ (5 May 2015). This initiative is
now being promoted jointly with Canada: see joint paper with the Canadian government
presented at an informal ministerial meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos:
Government of Canada, ‘The Case for Creating a Multilateral Investment Dispute
Settlement Mechanism’ (20 January 2017).
49 D. Davis, ‘Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union’, The Times (15 May
2017), 10.
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the participation of Member States would have an impact on the scope
and, therefore, ambition of the EU–UK trade agreement.50
V Conclusion
This chapter argued that the main implications of Opinion 2/15 are
threefold. First, it bolsters the Union’s excusive competence to negotiate
and conclude trade agreements. It construes the scope of the CCP
broadly and places the policy ﬁrmly within the reconﬁgured framework
of external action set out in the Lisbon Treaty. It also approaches the
Union’s exclusive implied competence broadly and conﬁrms the low
threshold for the exclusivity test to be met.
Second, in terms of speciﬁc external policies, it brings some much-
needed clarity on the nature of the Union’s competence. This is helpful,
given the considerable disputes among the EU institutions and between
them and the Member States about the division of powers in EU external
relations. The practical implications of this development are all the more
signiﬁcant given the Union’s current policy choice to negotiate compre-
hensive trade agreements.51
Third, the practical implications of Opinion 2/15 for treaty-making by
the EU alone or with its Member States depend on the political will of the
Union’s decision-makers. It is for the Council, and ultimately the
Member States, to decide on the content of the agreements that the EU
negotiates and, therefore, the ensuing procedures for their conclusion.
In other words, the locus of power for choosing mixity has not changed.
It is the context within which mixity is relied upon that is shifting, as
Opinion 2/15, in legal terms, and the public disquiet inMember States, in
political terms, highlight the parameters within which the Union may
exercise its competence to conclude trade agreements.
50 See also M. Cremona, ‘Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of
16 May 2017’, (2018) 14 EuConst. 231 at 258.
51 For instance, a trade and sustainable development chapter is also included in the
Agreements with South Korea, Vietnam, Colombia and Peru and Japan.
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